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THE TAKE DOWN: CASE STUDIES REGARDING “LAWFARE” IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE WEST AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 
David M. Crane* 
The law is a powerful tool. Some say it can be used as a weapon. 
That power was used to bring down the most disruptive and evil warlord in 
Africa and his co-defendants not just by the stroke of a pen on March 3, 
2003, but in the execution of two operations, Operation Justice and its fol-
low-on Operation Rope. This Article uses these operations as case studies 
to show that the law can be used as a powerful weapon. 
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I.  THE SITUATION 
The civil war in Sierra Leone ripped apart an entire region of West 
Africa. Spawned by the President of Libya, Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi, 
and supported by Presidents Blasé Compare of Burkina Faso and Charles 
Taylor of Liberia, this take-over of an entire country for their own personal 
criminal gain was a rare event in conflict not seen since the middle ages. 
The West African Joint Criminal Enterprise was designed to support the 
geo-political takeover of West Africa by Ghaddafi where surrogates such as 
Compare and Taylor, among others, would control the region on his behalf. 
Fueled by diamonds, gold, and timber, these commodities were traded for 
cash to pad the coffers of three heads of state, gun runners, diamond dealers, 
and boy-generals, and to buy weapons to take down not only Burkina Faso, 
Liberia, but Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, and Guinea.1  
  
 * Professor, Syracuse University College of Law and former founding Chief Prosecutor of 
the international war crimes tribunal in West Africa called the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, 2002–2005. The following Article is based on the accounts of the author while Chief 
Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
 1 The diamond mines provided essential funding for the war, and without access to them, 
the RUF would be unable to support their troops. See Ian Smillie, Lansane Gberie & Ralph 
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The result of this enterprise was the complete destruction of two 
countries, Liberia and Sierra Leone, where women and children were bruta-
lized and forced into the rebel forces as either bush wives or child soldiers 
respectively, and the murder, rape, and maiming of around 1.2 million hu-
man beings occurred. The civil war in Sierra Leone was indicative of the 
horror of a succession of internal armed conflicts, which saw the chopping 
off of limbs as a way to intimidate and terrorize the populace into submis-
sion. The world recoiled in horror.2  
II.  THE MISSION 
In an attempt to stop this horror, the President of Sierra Leone asked 
for help from the United Nations.3 A second peace treaty was signed in 
  
Hazelton, The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds, and Human Security 6 (2000), 
available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/heartmatter.html; See infra Appendix A (presenting 
a schematic of the West African Joint Enterprise).  
 2 The rebel forces committed the most atrocious human rights violations of Sierra 
Leone’s civil war during the invasion on the capital. See, e.g., Jon M. Van Dyke, The Fun-
damental Human Right to Prosecution and Compensation, 29 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 77, 
78 (2001). The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) forces were eventually able to regain control over Freetown. However, the 
fighting was fierce, resulting in the deaths of approximately 7,000 people and two-thirds of 
Freetown being destroyed. See U.N. Secretary-General, 5th Rep. of the Secretary-General on 
the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/1999/237 (Mar. 4, 1999) (de-
scribing the RUF attack on Freetown and the resultant effects). As a result of the anarchy, 
about 600,000 of Sierra Leone’s estimated population of four million people sought sanctu-
ary in neighboring nations, and two-thirds of those who remained in Sierra Leone were inter-
nally displaced. See U.N. Secretary-General, 6th Rep. of the Secretary-General on the U.N. 
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/1999/645 (June 4, 1999) (describing the 
then-current status of the Sierra Leonean refugees and internally displaced persons). 
 3 Under the first peace agreement, which lasted several months, Executive Outcomes was 
forced to leave Sierra Leone to be replaced by Nigerian peacekeepers. Peace Agreement 
Between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United 
Front of Sierra Leone, art. 12, Nov. 30, 1996, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/ 
abidjanaccord.html [hereinafter Abidjan Peace Accord]. The RUF achieved increased politi-
cal legitimacy under the Abidjan Peace Accord, and it appeared that it would be recognized 
as a political party. Diane Marie Amann, Message as a Medium in Sierra Leone, 7 ILSA J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 239 (2001). However in May 1997, Johnny Paul Koroma of the AFRC, 
which soon after joined with the RUF to form the AFRC/RUF, overthrew President Kabbah. 
The AFRC/RUF proved an especially brutal regime. Determined to protect innocent civi-
lians, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with the support of the 
U.N. Security Council, increased the number of Nigerian troops stationed in Sierra Leone. 
See S.C. Res. 1171, U.N. Doc. S/RES1171 (June 5, 1998) (preventing the supply of arms to 
the RUF and restricting the movement of its military leaders). The AFRC/RUF signed an 
agreement with Kabbah’s deposed government, and with ECOWAS support, President Kab-
bah was returned to Freetown. The RUF continued to commit war crimes in the East, reple-
nishing its war chest through diamond sales to President Taylor of Liberia. During this time, 
Foday Sankoh was captured in Nigeria and returned to Freetown, where he was tried and 
sentenced to death for his role in the civil war. In January 1999, the RUF once again attacked 
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1999 which abated the conflict somewhat and U.N. peacekeepers were in-
serted into Sierra Leone to enforce the peace.4 After a shaky start which saw 
even the peacekeepers victimized by the rebels, the conflict came to an end 
in 2002.5 It was only during those years that the full extent of the crimes 
committed in Sierra Leone was understood. At the request of the Secretary 
General of the United Nations, the Security Council gave Kofi Annan the 
  
Freetown, this time defeating the peacekeepers in ―Operation No Living Thing.‖ Thousands 
of children were forcibly conscripted into the RUF army, drugged, killed, burned alive, or 
raped, before the rebels were driven away. See Human Rights Watch, Getting Away with 
Murder, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/sierra/SIERLE99.htm. In early 1999, 
there was essentially a stalemate. ECOMOG peacekeepers protected the capital (although 
they also stood accused of summary executions, rapes, and murders), but seemed unable to 
defeat the RUF and its allies. The RUF seemed content holding only the diamond-mining 
districts, as they had never seemed as interested in political power as they were in controlling 
access to the mines. 
 4 Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 
United Front of Sierra Leone, July 7, 1999, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/ 
Loméaccord.html [hereinafter Lomé Peace Agreement]. Most controversially, the Lomé 
Accord granted complete amnesty to all combatants. Article IX reads in part:  
[2] After the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone 
shall also grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and colla-
borators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the 
time of the signing of the present Agreement. [3] To consolidate the peace and 
promote the cause of national reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall 
ensure that no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the 
RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect of anything done by them in pursuit 
of their objectives as members of those organizations, since March 1991, up to the 
time of the signing of the present Agreement. In addition, legislative and other 
measures necessary to guarantee immunity to former combatants, exiles and other 
persons, currently outside the country for reasons related to the armed conflict shall 
be adopted ensuring the full exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view 
to their reintegration within a framework of full legality.   
Id. art. IX, § 2–3. The Lomé Peace Accord also established a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC), created as an instrument for addressing the abhorrent violence to pro-
mote and facilitate reconciliation for a deeply fragmented people. Id. arts. VI & XXVI. Dis-
regarding the terms of the Accord, the RUF resumed its practice of committing violent acts 
against the people of Sierra Leone. Daniel J. Macaluso, Absolute and Free Pardon: The 
Effect of the Amnesty Provision in the Lomé Peace Agreement on the Jurisdiction of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 347, 350 (2001). Seeking to take pow-
er from the AFRC, the RUF did not fully comply with the Lomé Accord. 
 5 In May of 2000, rebel forces attracted the international community’s attention by taking 
500 U.N. Peace Keepers as hostages. Thereafter, Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, was 
captured and arrested, initiating a dialogue calling for the creation of an international crimi-
nal court for Sierra Leone to try those responsible for the grave crimes committed in viola-
tion of international law. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 
198, n. 18 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3d ed. 2008) (citing Daniel J. Macaluso, Absolute and 
Free Pardon: The Effect of the Amnesty Provision in the Lomé Peace Agreement on the 
Jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 27 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 347, 350–51 
(2001)). 
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authority to explore various mechanisms to seek justice for the tens of thou-
sands of victims of the civil war in Sierra Leone.6 
The result was the world’s first international hybrid tribunal.7 It was 
a bold new experiment in delivering international justice. The war crimes 
weary international community was loath to create another cumbersome and 
expensive ad-hoc tribunal such as in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The Special 
Court for Sierra Leone was designed to be more efficient and effective. 
Created by the United Nations and the Republic of Sierra Leone, the court 
would essentially be of the United Nations, but not in the United Nations, 
thus freeing it of the byzantine administrative rules of that body.  
The court would be located in Freetown, right at the scene of the 
crimes. Its mandate would be simple and workable: prosecute those who 
bore the greatest responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
during the civil war in Sierra Leone from 1996 to the present.8 This allowed 
  
 6 In August 2000, the U.N.’s Security Council adopted Resolution 1315, which requested 
that the Secretary-General consult with the government of Sierra Leone on the creation of an 
independent international court that would have jurisdiction over those most responsible for 
the notorious human rights violations committed during the conflict, such as crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. Permanent Rep. of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/786 (Aug. 10, 2000); see also 
Avril McDonald, Sierra Leone’s Shoestring Special Court, 84 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 121, 
124 (2002) (discussing the differences in the creation of this tribunal and other tribunals). 
 7 In August 2000, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1315 created a framework for the 
establishment of an independent special court in Sierra Leone to address ―crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well 
as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law committed within the territory of Sierra Leone.‖ 
S.C. Res. 1315, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000). Resolution 1315 also requested 
the Secretary-General to ―negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to 
create an independent special court.‖ Id. ¶ 1. 
 8 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1 (Jan. 16, 2002), available at 
http://www.sc-sl.org/DOCUMENTS/tabid/176/Default.aspx; See also Special Court Agree-
ment, Ratification Act 2002, art. 1 (April 25, 2002), available at http://www.scsl.org/ 
DOCUMENTS/tabid/176/Default.aspx. Article 1(1) of the Agreement states:  
There is hereby established a Special Court for Sierra Leone.‖ Article 21 of the 
Agreement states: ―The present agreement shall enter into force on the day after 
both Parties have notified each other in writing that the legal requirements for entry 
into force have been complied with.‖ The notification required under Article 21 
took place on April 11, 2002. The Special Court is the first international tribunal to 
utilize ―greatest responsibility‖ as its standard for prosecution. Although this stan-
dard was recommended in the initial U.N. Security Council Resolution, a subse-
quent report by the Secretary-General suggested replacing it with the more general 
phrase ―persons most responsible. 
According to the Secretary-General, this broader mandate would permit the prosecution of 
―others in command authority down the chain of command‖ who could be regarded as ―most 
responsible judging by the severity of the crime or its massive scale.‖ U.N. Secretary-
General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (October 4, 2000). Ultimately, the Special Court’s Sta-
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the Prosecutor to narrow the range of possible defendants in the hopes that 
the investigations, indictments, and trials would take less time than its sister 
tribunals in Arusha and The Hague.9  
In the summer of 2002, the Prosecutor and the Registrar started to 
set up the Special Court and began the justice process for the people of Sier-
ra Leone.10 Within seven months, the Prosecutor had indicted and arrested 
  
tute employed the language of the Security Council Resolution, however, the mandate’s 
interpretation is left to the prosecutor’s discretion. 
 9 The subject matter jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) is similar 
to the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Article 2 of the Statute of the 
SCSL lists the crimes against humanity that the SCSL will have the power to prosecute. 
Statute of the SCSL, art. 2, Jan. 16, 2000, U.N. Doc. 5/2002/246, available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/scsl-statute.html. These include crimes such as murder, extermination, enslavement, 
imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts, if they were committed as ―part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population.‖ Id. Article 3 covers ―Viola-
tions of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.‖ Id. art. 
3. The crimes in Article 3 are defined exactly the same as those in Article 4 of the Additional 
Protocol for Non-International Armed Conflict, including mutilation, torture, collective 
punishments, hostage-taking, terrorism, pillage, summary executions, and outrages on per-
sonal dignity. Id. Article 4 enumerates ―Other Serious Violations of International Humanita-
rian Law,‖ including intentional attacks on civilian targets, intentional attacks on humanita-
rian and peacekeeping personnel, and abduction and recruitment of children under the age of 
fifteen into armed groups. Id. art. 4. Not included on this list of crimes is genocide, since the 
attacks on civilians in Sierra Leone do not appear to have had an ethnic element. See id. In 
addition to the crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law, Article 5 of the Statute provides jurisdiction for ―Crimes under 
Sierra Leonean Law,‖ unlike the ICTR and ICTY for their respective jurisdictions. Id. art. 5. 
 10 In April 2002, three months after the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Na-
tions signed the agreement establishing the Special Court, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan appointed the Registrar and the Chief Prosecutor. They arrived in Freetown in late 
July and early August 2002, respectively. They began operations in difficult conditions. An 
advance planning task force had determined the necessity of the erection of a new facility to 
house the Court. The Court lacked formal ties to the United Nations. However, assistance 
from the government of Sierra Leone was forthcoming. An 11.5-acre plot of land in central 
Freetown, donated by the Government, would serve as the Court’s site; to include staff offic-
es, courtrooms, and prison facilities. Until January 2003, the Registry operated in provisional 
offices owned by the Bank of Sierra Leone, while the Office of the Prosecutor, located in a 
private residence a few kilometers away, was not relocated to the permanent site until August 
2003. One year after the Court began its operations, the Registry was still in the process of 
formation. By April 2003, because the top priority was getting the Office of the Prosecutor 
up and running, the Special Court had only hired 55 percent of its expected total personnel of 
256. By the time the Court had to deal with its first detainees, with the first wave of indict-
ments and arrests on March 10, 2003, it had made much progress. However, there existed no 
permanent prison facilities, courtroom, or functional defense office. Rehabilitated buildings 
on Bonthe Island were used to house the detainees during the initial months. Forty minutes 
from Freetown by helicopter, the island’s remote nature, selected for security reasons, posed 
accessibility problems for relatives, legal counsel, and journalists. On August 10, 2003, the 
accused were transferred to the permanent detention facility in Freetown. The President of 
 
File: Crane 2 Created on:  12/23/2010 8:30:00 PM Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:06:00 PM 
206 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 43:201 
the majority of those who bore the greatest responsibility. Within a year, all 
of the defendants were in custody, arraigned, and the trial process began. 
III.  THE EXECUTION 
The Prosecutor organized his prosecutorial strategy with a ten-step 
process with key milestones built-in to ensure proper management and ex-
ecution of the mandate given to him by the U.N. Security Council. In that 
strategy was a series of planned operations designed like a military and po-
litical operation using the full spectrum of tools in a legal battlefield to in-
clude diplomatic initiatives, information operations, and military support 
culminating in a complete tactical assault on the potential defendants using 
deception, surprise, and precision of action based on timely and actionable 
intelligence. 
The first operation, Operation Justice, was essentially a deception, 
information, and military operation, the second, Operation Rope, a psycho-
logical and diplomatic/political operation. Both were executed by the Office 
of the Prosecutor as a legal weapon to bring those who bore the greatest 
responsibility to justice. 
A.  Case Study Number One: Operation Justice 
The potential defendants were all living in and around Freetown 
and surrounding districts. Three defendants of the thirteen contemplated for 
arrest were in Liberia, including the sitting President Charles G. Taylor. All 
were the current or former heads of the warring factions in the civil war in 
Sierra Leone. All were assumed armed and dangerous. One of the defen-
dants was the sitting Minister of the Interior of Sierra Leone who had tech-
nical control of the arresting units that would help execute Operation Jus-
tice.11 Organizations involved in the arrest operation were members of the 
investigations section, Office of the Prosecutor, the Sierra Leonean National 
  
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, First Annual Report Dec. 2, 2002–Dec.1, 2003 at 5 
(2004), http://www.sc-sl.org/ 
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=NRhDcbHrcSs%3d&tabid=176(summarizing the court’s activities 
forthe period). 
 11 U.N. News Service, Prosecutor of UN-Assisted Sierra Leone Special Court to Step 
Down, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Feb. 28, 2005), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?News 
ID=13486&Cr=sierra&Cr1=leone. Chief Sam Hinga Norman was head of the Civil Defense 
Forces and the Kamajors during the decade long civil war. Ibrahim Bangoura, and Nhinson 
Williams, Sierra Leone: The Pre and Post War Overview; a Combination of Tragedy, Threat 
and Insecurity, (April 20, 2003), http://www.tlcafrica.com/tlc_sierraleone.htm. He was polit-
ically a problem for the Prosecutor as many Sierra Leoneans thought him a national hero for 
his defense of the country. Michael Nesbitt, Lessons from the Sam Hinga Norman Decision 
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone: How Trials and Truth Commissions can Co-Exist, 
8.10 GERMAN L. J. 977, 995 (2007). They would largely change their attitude when the real 
facts were presented during his trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
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Police, the United Nations Peacekeepers in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), land 
and naval forces of the United Kingdom, as well as various embassies, to 
include the United States and the United Kingdom. 
The mission given to the organizations and units was the takedown 
of all of the targeted defendants in Sierra Leone via a surprise arrest opera-
tion and transfer to Bonthe Island where the Office of the Registrar, under 
the cover of a rehabilitation project, had constructed a detention facility. 
The planning and execution of Operation Justice took place over 
several months beginning in late September 2002 and ended a week prior to 
the take down of the defendants on March 10, 2003. A security group was 
set up by the Prosecutor under the auspices of the British High Commission, 
which met as needed, but at a minimum of once a month. Members included 
the Ambassador from the U.S., Inspector General of the Sierra Leone Na-
tional Police, Chief of Staff of the Force within UNAMSIL, Commanding 
General of the British Training Command in Sierra Leone, British High 
Commissioner, and Prosecutor. No one else knew of the existence of this 
group. Within the group the information was specifically compartmenta-
lized, each member only kept aware of specific requirements as needed for 
security purposes.12 
The Chief of Investigations in the Office of the Prosecutor had 
overall control of the arrest operation, including its planning and execution. 
During this planning stage, the Prosecutor initiated an information operation 
to confuse and distract the various defendants and arrestees from the real 
operation. Each month the Prosecutor would meet with the local, regional, 
and international media and tell them truthfully that the case was complex, 
worldwide in-scope, and he revealed to the public that the anticipated open-
ing of the trials was at least a year away. The intent was to ensure that the 
various arrestees would not flee or the Minister of Interior, a target, would 
not hamper the investigation or become aware of the planning for Operation 
Justice.  
While this was ongoing, the normal routine of setting up of an in-
ternational tribunal continued for all to see. Along with this, an old jail on 
Bonthe Island was being refurbished under the guise of a legacy project for 
the Sierra Leone National Police, when in reality the jail was to be the tem-
porary detention for the various defendants taken down in Operation Justice. 
The Chief of Prosecutions continued to assist in the investigations and be-
gan drafting indictments on each of the thirteen defendants. To the outside 
observer, the Special Court was busy about its work to fulfill its mandate, 
while just under the surface Operation Justice was in full swing. 
  
 12 Operational security was very important. A vast majority of individuals working for the 
Office of the Prosecutor were not aware of the planning for and even the execution of Opera-
tion Justice. The office was informed a few minutes after the take-down had taken place. 
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The Inspector General of Police was a central figure in the planning 
of Operation Justice. A retired former senior British policeman, he would be 
in charge of the actual arrest of the defendants the day Operation Justice 
was executed, sometime in March of 2003. His mission included providing 
surveillance of all known suspects, riot control trained forces for stability 
operations, teams in support of the investigation section, and three landing 
zones for the pickup of detainees on the day of the arrests. The American 
Embassy would provide the helicopters. 
As a military operation, it was important that a sufficient force be 
in-country to ensure that the country remained stable. In the fall of 2002, the 
Prosecutor and the British Government entered into an agreement to provide 
a land and naval force sufficient to ensure that the country would not col-
lapse. It was agreed that these forces would deploy to West Africa under the 
guise of a routine annual training exercises.13 Additionally, the Chief of 
Staff of the U.N. Forces in Sierra Leone would provide their quick reaction 
force of Pakistani Special Forces on the day of the execution of Operation 
Justice.14 
As the planning for Operation Justice proceeded operationally, the 
Office of the Prosecutor was developing a criminal information network of 
trusted assets throughout West Africa, over time penetrating the inner cir-
cles of the Taylor regime, as well as countries, organizations, and institu-
tions. These assets were critical to providing intelligence and criminal in-
formation to the Prosecutor and the security group as Operation Justice 
moved forward and the follow-on Operation Rope, began to take shape. 
Coordination with other national intelligence systems worldwide also pro-
vided some useful intelligence. 
The result of all this planning on the legal, diplomatic, military, in-
telligence, and practical fronts resulted in a flawless execution of Operation 
Justice on March 10, 2003. All of the defendants targeted for arrest were 
taken by surprise within fifty-five minutes, and within two hours, were safe-
ly incarcerated on Bonthe Island. From that point on the rules of evidence 
and procedure kicked in and the pre-trial process began. Operation Justice 
ended at 4:00 p.m. local time, March 10, 2003. 
  
  
 13 The British government was an important operational element to Operation Justice. The 
Blair government would provide a ―spearhead‖ battalion to land and seize Lungi Airfield, 
Sierra Leone’s only international airport, and the HMS Iron Duke to sail into the harbor at 
Freetown on the day of the arrests.  
 14 It must be noted here that the Chief of Staff did all of his military planning without the 
knowledge of the Secretary General’s Special Representative (SRSG), who was not in sup-
port of the Special Court, and who in fact had taken direct action to harm its efforts. The 
Prosecutor informed the SRSG after the arrests had taken place and all of the indictees were 
aboard helicopters heading for detention. He was stunned. 
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B.  Case Study Number Two: Operation Rope 
Following Operation Justice, the Prosecutor sealed the indictment 
of then President Charles Taylor. It was feared that a publicly released in-
dictment of Taylor would jeopardize Operation Justice and further destabil-
ize the region. During the spring of 2003, the United States invaded Iraq and 
the world’s attention turned to the Middle East. While the world watched 
the United States stomp around Iraq, the Office of the Prosecutor began to 
plan for the take down of President Charles Taylor, now an indicted war 
criminal.  
The challenge and eventual mission was to unseal the indictment in 
a way that had maximum impact legally, diplomatically, and practically. In 
short, we had to literally ―blow him off the map‖ with little options availa-
ble to him politically. As the senior leadership contemplated all of this, a 
plan began to develop.  
The core of the plan was a psychological operation against Taylor 
himself. The intent was to draw him out and corner him politically to a 
place where he had few options. An additional challenge was to ensure that 
the international community also had few options regarding the indictment 
of a sitting head of state, which had taken place only one time before in 
modern history. It was anticipated that there would be political and diplo-
matic ―blowback,‖ particularly from the United States, the major support of 
the Special Court. 
The Prosecutor decided to execute what was called by the investiga-
tions section Operation Rope, gradually but consistently, building up to a 
dramatic unsealing of the indictment while Taylor was not in Liberia. How-
ever, in the spring of 2003, Taylor was not doing much travelling. To up the 
ante somewhat, the Prosecutor, as part of the psychological operation, began 
to issue various press releases regarding the three presidents of Libya, Bur-
kina Faso, and Liberia and their involvement in the West African joint crim-
inal enterprise; the fact that Taylor was harboring war criminals; and that 
Taylor was using blood diamonds for his personal gain, among other 
charges and allegations.  
At first Taylor did not ―take the bait,‖ but finally he reacted when 
the Prosecutor accused him of being behind the September 2002 coup at-
tempt in the Ivory Coast, and that one of the indicted, Samuel ―the Maskita‖ 
Bockerie, was the person in charge of the unrest in that neighboring country 
working for President Charles Taylor. The Prosecutor demanded that Taylor 
hand Bockerie over to the Special Court for a fair trial. Taylor announced 
publicly he did not have Bockerie—or Johnny Paul Koroma, the other in-
dicted in Liberia, for that matter.15 The next public release declared that the 
  
 15 One month prior to Operation Justice Johnny Paul Koroma, head of the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council in 1997, fled Sierra Leone to Liberia after trying to start a coup to 
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presence of Bockerie and Koroma was true and specifically told the world 
where both Bockerie and Koroma were located in Liberia according the 
Prosecutors intelligence assets.  
Also at this time, the Chief of Investigations was having his assets 
in the region send out signals that Taylor was in possible legal trouble. This 
encouraged the various rebel factions fighting against Taylor in Liberia to 
start their annual offensive towards the capital Monrovia. The Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), supported by Guinea, 
and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), supported by the 
Ivory Coast, began to move south and west respectively towards Monrovia. 
The military and political, as well as the psychological pressure on Taylor 
was mounting. 
It was at this point that it was realized that the LURD and MODEL 
could greatly assist the Prosecutor to bring military pressure on Taylor in 
the hopes that he would do something or react in a way that would give the 
Prosecutor the opportunity to unseal the indictment. Unsealing the indict-
ment was going to be used, for all intents and purposes, as a legal club to 
knock Taylor out of Liberia. 
As Operation Rope progressed, all of this activity began to take on 
international significance and interest, thus drawing the press back to West 
Africa to cover the building tension in Liberia. The intelligence assets in 
Liberia working for the Prosecutor began to individually and separately 
report increased concern by Taylor over rebel activities and the accusations 
by the Prosecutor that he was harboring indicted war criminals in violation 
of international law. The pressure continued to build throughout the month 
of May 2003. The psychological aspects of Operation Rope were starting to 
work.  
Finally, Taylor himself handed us—the prosecution team—the op-
portunity to execute the final aspects of Operation Rope when he agreed to 
peace talks with the LURD and MODEL in Accra, the capital of Ghana.16 
With that announcement, the final diplomatic aspect of the operation was 
finalized. In late May, in order to keep up the media interest in Taylor and 
  
throw out the current government and the Special Court. The coup was found out and Koro-
ma just escaped arrest. The Prosecutor indicted him for war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity on 3 March 2003. 
 16 Sensing weakness, this year’s annual military operation to take Monrovia by the various 
rebel groups took on a certain urgency and intensity. Taylor understood this as well and 
sought ―peace.‖ In fact, he was only using the peace talks as a delaying tactic to consolidate 
his positions, refit, resupply, and counterattack. He had done this several times before in the 
give and take of the rebellion against him in the late 1990’s. See generally EUROPA PUBL’NS, 
AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, 2004, at 610 (33d ed. 2003) (presenting the series of events 
that took place during and after the peace talks in Ghana that could lead one to infer that the 
peace talks were no more than a means to strengthen the Liberians United for Reconciliation 
and Democracy (LURD) position before attacking Monrovia). 
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his association with the civil war in Sierra Leone, the Prosecutor once again 
demanded publicly that Taylor turn over Bockerie to the tribunal. Taylor 
finally agreed to do so, but in a horrific way, by shipping Bockerie to the 
Prosecutor in a box on his birthday. According to Taylor’s story, Bockerie 
had been killed resisting arrest. The autopsy later revealed he had been 
murdered by a firing squad.17  
The final phase of Operation Rope was the unsealing of the indict-
ment of Taylor when he arrived in Ghana for peace talks. Part of the final 
phase was also to notify the key political players in the region and interna-
tionally twenty-four hours before the unsealing of the indictment that a sig-
nificant event would take place within those twenty-four hours. Then, on the 
morning of the unsealing of the indictment—the morning when Taylor left 
Liberia and landed in Ghana—the Registrar would personally serve on the 
Ghanaian High Commissioner in Sierra Leone a certified copy of the in-
dictment and arrest warrant, and fax and email those documents to the Gha-
naian Foreign Ministry in Accra. When that was confirmed, members of the 
Office of the Prosecutor hand-carried a letter from the Prosecutor to the 
President of Sierra Leone, the head of the U.N. Peacekeeping Force, the 
American Ambassadors in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and the British High 
Commissioner in Sierra Leone. The letter told each of them that at 11:00 
a.m. that morning local time, when President Charles Taylor was walking 
up the stairs to attend the opening of the Accra Peace Accords, the Prosecu-
tor was publicly announcing that Taylor had been indicted on seventeen 
counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity and would be asking the 
Ghanaian government to hand him over to the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone for trial. The Prosecutor also asked that they notify their governments 
as appropriate.18 
Then at 11:00 a.m. local time, the Prosecutor read a statement to the 
press at U.N. headquarters in Sierra Leone that he was unsealing the indict-
ment against the sitting President of Liberia Charles G. Taylor for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. Taylor was informed at the location 
where the opening of the accords would begin that he had been indicted. 
Several other African leaders were also informed and Taylor was whisked 
  
 17 The sad and tragic story is that Taylor had Bockerie’s family murdered as well. Eric 
Pape, Cleaning House, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Oct. 2003, at 69, available at http://www.legalaffairs 
.org/issues/September-October-2003/story_pape_sepoct03.msp. Koroma was also murdered 
in the eastern part of Liberia and our contact reported witnessing his body’s dismemberment. 
Id. Koroma has never been found. His indictment has never been withdrawn. He is the only 
indictee not brought to justice before the Special Court. 
 18 At the last minute the United States asked the Prosecutor not to unseal the indictment. 
He refused. It is important to note that the United States had been given a signed copy of the 
indictment of President Charles Taylor two months before it was unsealed. The Prosecutor 
personally gave both the U.S. Ambassador for Sierra Leone and the Ambassador at Large for 
War Crimes. 
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back to the airport and Monrovia. The political end to President Charles 
Taylor had begun. It took several more weeks, but in August of 2003, he 
was forced to step down and was moved to Calabar, Nigeria in a type of 
―exile/house arrest‖ as the international community began to figure out what 
to do next. Operation Rope had largely succeeded.  
IV.  REFLECTIONS: THE RULE OF LAW IS MORE POWERFUL THAN THE RULE 
OF THE GUN! 
The term ―lawfare‖ has been viewed somewhat negatively and at 
best as a clever turn of a phrase. Used in the appropriate context it can be a 
force for good and positive change. It is hoped that these two case studies 
will highlight how the law can be used as a tool and a weapon to allow an 
international prosecutor to execute his mandate in a way that saw justice for 
the victims of the internal armed conflict that was the civil war in Sierra 
Leone.  
Operation Justice and Operation Rope illustrate the multi-
dimensional aspects of justice at the international level. It is a naïve Prose-
cutor who only focuses or considers the legal dimension. International jus-
tice is inherently political in scope and the diplomatic, military/security, and 
practical ramifications of investigating, indicting, arresting, and prosecuting 
senior members of various warring factions in an armed conflict are signifi-
cant. The figure below demonstrates this.19 These various ramifications can 
put a prosecutorial strategy at risk and even jeopardize the tribunal or court 
itself. One could characterize all of this as ―lawfare.‖ 
  
 19 The bright red thread related to international criminal justice is politics. In most in-
stances it will be a political decision to set up an international justice mechanism, to support 
it, and to turn over indictees to that court for trial. 
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It must be stressed that one should view the term ―lawfare‖ as a de-
scriptive word that carries little legal significance and, in reality, practical 
importance. It was not considered or even talked about as a viable concept 
when Operation Justice and Operation Rope were planned and executed. 
Simply put, from the author’s perspective, ―lawfare‖ is an interesting aca-
demic concept, but in reality ―lawfare‖ is just another term for the fact that a 
Prosecutor at the international level has to be not only an advocate, but also 
a savvy politician and diplomat to successfully complete one’s mandate. An 
understanding, background, or experience in military planning enhances 
that ability for success. Note, however, at the end of the day and whatever 
you call the execution of a plan or strategy, it has been shown that the rule 
of law is more powerful than the rule of the gun.20 
 
 
 
  
 20 During my three years in Sierra Leone, I walked the countryside in a variation of the 
classic town hall concept. Part of the Court’s Outreach Program, this concept originated in 
the Office of the Prosecutor as part of the Prosecutor’s overall strategic plan. It was trans-
ferred to the Registry in early 2003. During the early town hall meetings where we literally 
walked the entire country, I told a skeptical audience that the law is fair, no one is above the 
law, and that the rule of law is more powerful than the rule of the gun. 
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Appendix A: The West African Joint Criminal Enterprise 
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